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2 3 4	RICHARD J. CHIVARO Chief Counsel, State Bar No. 124391 RONALD V. PLACET Senior Staff Counsel, State Bar No. 155020 SHAWN D. SILVA Senior Staff Counsel, State Bar No. 190019 ANA MARIA GARZA Staff Counsel, State Bar No. 200255 OFFICE OF THE STATE CONTROLLER	FILED/ENDORSED JAN 2 0 2009 By: L. Whitfield Deputy Clerk
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9 10	Attorneys for Respondent/Defendant CALIFORN JOHN CHIANG	IIA STATE CONTROLLER
11	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE	E STATE OF CALIFORNIA
12	COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO	
13		
14 15 16	PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS IN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT; CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL SCIENTISTS,	Case No. 34-2008-80000126 Related Cases: 34-2009-80000134 and 34-2009-80000135
17 18 19 20 21 22	Petitioners/Plaintiffs, vs. ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION; STATE CONTROLLER JOHN CHIANG; and DOES 1 THROUGH 20, inclusive, Respondents/Defendants.	CONTROLLER'S OPPOSITION TO REPONDENTS'/DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO VERIFIED PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINTS FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Date: January 29, 2009 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept: 19 Exempted from Fees (Govt. Code § 6103)
23		
24	Respondent/Defendant JOHN CHIANG,	California State Controller (hereinafter
26	"Controller") respectfully submits this Opposition to the Demurrer of ARNOLD	
27	SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; and DEPARTMENT OF	
28	PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION (collective)	y "Respondents"), to the Petitions for Writ of

Mandate and Complaints for Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief filed on December 22, 2008, by Petitioners/Plaintiffs PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS IN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT (PECG) and CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL SCIENTISTS (CAPS); on January 5, 2009 by CALIFORNIA ATTORNEYS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES AND HEARING OFFICERS IN STATE EMPLOYMENT; and on January 7, 2008, by Petitioner/Plaintiff SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 1000.

INTRODUCTION

In this pleading the Controller addresses both the Demurrer of Respondents and the Petitions and Complaints of the Petitioners in all of the related cases. As to the Petitions and Complaints, the Controller is in concurrence and incorporates by reference the arguments made therein. Like the Petitioners, the Controller concludes that the Governor is without authority to unilaterally furlough state employees. Therefore, this office has no intention of implementing the reduction in pay as contemplated in the Governor's Order, unless determined otherwise by a court of law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In the interests of brevity and judicial economy the Controller's Office incorporates by reference the statements of fact found in all previously filed pleadings in these cases.

LAW & ARGUMENT

I. A DEMURRER IN THIS CASE IS INAPPROPRIATE SINCE THE CORE ISSUE IS THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR TO ORDER THE FURLOUGH, NOT THE PROCESS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAGING OR OTHER DILLS ACT ISSUES.

Respondents attempt to frame the argument in the context of a Dills Act issue, by citing Government Code¹ section 3516.5, as authority for the Governor's executive order. However, the real question in this case is whether the Governor actually has the authority to impose a furlough on state employees. Review of Section 3516.5 reveals its inapplicability to the case at hand. Section 3516.5 is only a procedural section, which simply permits the employer (the Governor) to meet and confer *after* the adoption of a law, rule, resolution, or regulation in cases of emergency, rather than *before*. However, this section does not grant the Governor the authority to take any specific action or contravene the authority or intent of the Legislature (as reflected in Sections 19826(b), 19851, and 19852). It is clear that Section 3516.5 does not provide the Governor the authority to impose a furlough on state employees, or to take any other action not already provided for in law. Therefore, the question pending before this court is whether or not the Governor has the authority to impose the furlough. And over this question this court unquestionably has jurisdiction.

When we look at Sections 19826(b), 19851 and 19852, it becomes clear that not only does the Governor not have affirmative authority to furlough, but there is also an explicit statutory prohibition against such action. Section 19826(b) prohibits Respondent Department of Personnel Administration from establishing, adjusting, or recommending a salary for represented employees. Sections 19851 and 19852 establish the forty hour work week for all state employees, providing for the possibility of a 4 day, forty hour week. None of these sections evinces an intent on the part of the Legislature to relinquish their ultimate authority over the wages of state employees. *Lowe v. Resources Agency* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1151. The determination of the meaning of Sections 19826(b), 19851, and 19852, is one of statutory interpretation. This process is handled on a regular basis by trial courts in this state; no special administrative expertise is required, nor of any benefit, in this case.

Respondents' in their Demurrer attempt to argue that Section 19826(b) [and presumably 19851 and 19852] is rendered inoperative, or superceded, by the fact that an MOU is effective

¹ All further statutory references shall be to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.

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under Section 3517.8(a). However, such an argument misapprehends the effect of Section 3517.6 on existing statutes. That section specifically provides that the enumerated statutory provisions are only superceded when the MOU and the statute are in conflict. In this case, the Respondent has neither alleged nor demonstrated that any provision of the MOU is in conflict with Section 19826(b). Therefore, the provisions of Section 19826(b) are in full force and effect, prohibiting the Governor from altering the salaries of represented employees, and presenting an issue of law that is appropriately before this court.

II. RESPONDENTS' EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ARGUMENTS CONVENIENTLY IGNORE THE PRESENCE OF SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES AMONG THE PETITIONERS, WHO ARE EXCEPTED FROM THE DILLS ACT.

Demurrer is also inappropriate because the Public Employees Relations Board (PERB) does not have jurisdiction over all of the Petitioners. Petitioners Professional Engineers In California Government (PECG) and California Association Of Professional Scientists (CAPS) are supervisory employee organizations pursuant to Section 3527(c), as well as duly certified exclusive collective bargaining representatives for represented employees, pursuant to Section 3520.5. [See Petition of PECG and CAPS at ¶¶ 1 and 2.] In the former capacity they represent supervisory employees, who are excepted from the Dills Act, and thus not subject to the jurisdiction of PERB. [See Sections 3513(c), 3527(b), and 3531.] These supervisory employees provide an independent basis for jurisdiction for this court, rendering the Respondents arguments concerning the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as to represented employees, moot. Therefore, those supervisory employees are properly before this court and demurrer would be inappropriate.

III. DEMURRER WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE THERE REMAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN THE CONTROLLER AND RESPONDENDTS, WHICH ARE NOT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF PERB.

A dismissal upon demurrer is only appropriate when it resolves all outstanding issues before the parties. However, the Respondents' demurrer does not resolve the issues between the Respondents and the Controller. The Controller is a constitutional officer, and as such is not under the direct authority of the Governor. McCauley v. Brooks (1860) 16 Cal. 11. The

Controller has independent duties as provided for in both the Constitution and in statute. In carrying out those duties, the Controller has the authority to determine whether a decision made by an agency, which impinges on the operations of the Controller, is within the fundamental jurisdiction of that agency. *Tirapelle v. Davis* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1333. After review of the Governor's Executive Order (S-16-08), the Controller has come to the conclusion that it is not within the fundamental jurisdiction of either the Governor or DPA to unilaterally furlough state employees. This is because the ultimate authority over salaries is placed in the legislature, and "DPA can act only to the extent and in a manner consistent with the legislative delegation of authority." *Id* at 1323. And neither the Governor nor DPA has been able to cite a delegation of authority that supports such action. Therefore, the Controller has no intention of implementing the Governor's furlough plan, absent a ruling to the contrary from a court of law. PERB has no jurisdiction over the Controller and therefore cannot provide any resolution of this outstanding conflict.

Although the Controller has been nominally named as a Respondent/Defendant, his interests are more closely aligned with the Petitioners', as noted above. But for the short timeframe, the Controller would have filed a formal motion to realign the parties, seeking to be redesignated as a Petitioner/ Plaintiff. Given the practical opposition of the Controller and the Respondents, and the lack of jurisdiction by PERB over the Controller, it is appropriate for this court to retain jurisdiction over this matter to resolve the outstanding issues.

CONCLUSION

The issues presented by the petitions are predominately related to the authority of the Governor to impose the furlough he seeks, not the Dills Act. Since any Dills Act issues are nominal at best, and there are parties who are not subject to the jurisdiction of PERB, jurisdiction of the case should be retained by this court, and the demurrer denied.

1	Dated: January 20, 2009
2	OFFICE OF THE STATE CONTROLLER
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4	By:
5	RICHARD J. CHIVARO, Chief Counsel Attorney for Respondent/Defendant
6	Attorney for Respondent/Defendant
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